Summary:
The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power is simulated with a single stage Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Market power assessment for multiple stages is then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme. The decision in each stage and state is the equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Thereafter, mitigation measures, especially bilateral contracts, are investigated. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented and discussed
Keywords: Game theory, hydroelectric-thermal power generation, power generation economics.
JCR Impact Factor and WoS quartile: 6,500 - Q1 (2023)
DOI reference:
https://doi.org/10.1109/59.932268
Published on paper: August 2001.
Published on-line: August 2001.
Citation:
R. Kelman, L.A. Barroso, M. V. Pereira, Market power assessment and mitigation in hydrothermal systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Vol. 16, nº. 3, pp. 354 - 359, August 2001. [Online: August 2001]
